
Two questions, and most organizations only think about the first: who gets in, and what can they reach once they are in.
This article covers admin roles, how site links and roles relate, the Account Holder, and two-factor authentication. It is for administrators setting up a team.
One person, and the role is deliberately special.
The Account Holder cannot be deleted and cannot be assigned to a different role. They are the only person who can reach the subscription, and the only one who can change another administrator's permissions. Some organization-wide settings are set by them and apply to every administrator in the portal.
This matters for a practical reason: if the Account Holder is somebody who has left, or a shared address nobody monitors, you have a problem before anything goes wrong. Transfer it deliberately with Make account holder rather than discovering the gap during an emergency.
Usually not. This is the most useful thing on this page and the most commonly missed.
Linking an administrator to a site is already a scope limit. It confines them to that site's people and work on its own, with no admin role involved. For a lot of multi-location organizations that is the whole permissions setup, finished.
Admin roles are then the exception layer, for the two cases site links cannot express:
So the order is: link to a site first, and add a role only when you hit one of those two cases. Building elaborate roles alongside site links usually means two systems doing one job, and it becomes very hard to answer "why can this person see that".
Then admin roles do the whole job, and they do more than scope.
A role controls both:
That second part is worth using. Somebody who needs to read the schedule and mark attendance does not need permission to delete shifts, and the difference between view and delete is the difference between a mistake and an incident.
Beyond the site link, profile access can be limited to:
Choosing both conditions means a profile has to satisfy the two of them together to be visible, not either one.
It is the tightest setting available and it is easy to pick by accident, because it reads like it should widen access rather than narrow it. The symptom is a coordinator who signs in and sees almost nobody. If that happens, this is the first thing to check.
No, and this is the part that catches people out.
The same scoping is set separately for what an administrator can reach in:
Setting one does not set the others. An administrator correctly limited to their own programme's profiles can still be able to read every form submission in the organization if you never scoped that separately. Check all four rather than assuming they follow the profile setting.
A code at login on top of the password. The administrator registers a secure phone number and enters a code each time they sign in.
You decide whether it is offered or required, and whether that applies to administrators, to end users, or to both.
If you do only one thing on this page, require it for administrators.
The reasoning is simple: an administrator account can export your entire database. A user account cannot.
Their 2FA is tied to the verified number. Removing that number disables 2FA for them until they verify a new one.
Worth knowing before you enforce it for everyone, because phone changes are the single most common support request that follows.
No. Two-factor authentication is available on every plan. Single sign-on needs Ultimate, is configured separately, and can be enforced so that it becomes the only way in.
If SSO is out of reach, 2FA is the security control to turn on instead. It is not a lesser version of the same thing, and plenty of organizations run both.